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1 Project Summary/Abstract
The objective of this research is to investigate architectural mechanisms to provide an emergency
response capability for Cyber Infrastructure management through the use of distributed, highly
secure, protected domains. Instead of creating a costly physically separate cyber domain, logical
separation is used. This work developed an architecture and prototype demonstration in the
context of an open source operating system.
2 Project Description
Introduction
Currently our national cyber infrastructure is vulnerable at both the node and router levels to
attacks by adversaries ranging from untutored script-wielding novices to sophisticated threats
from well-funded, well-organized groups and nation states. These attacks can result in the
exposure of sensitive information, corruption of critical data, and the denial of system and
network use by authorized entities. Although considerable effort has been devoted to the
detection of attacks, little has been invested in infrastructure architectures that would permit a
well-managed response to these attacks.
In a speech presented at the Microsoft Conference Center in Redmond, Washington on 4 June
2002, Richard Clarke, Special Advisor to the President for Cyber Space Security and Chairman,
President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, called for research to create separate
protected channels for the administration of critical components of the National Information
Infrastructure. Such channels would permit the management of computers and networks even
when the infrastructure was under attack and would permit the management components to
allocate resources to services critical for local, state, and national response.
Current computer and network architectures do not provide separation of resource management
services from those supporting run-time activities. Thus, through the corruption of payload and
2runtime facilities, the ability to manage the information infrastructure or provide critical
emergency functions can be sabotaged. Although a physically separate resource management /
emergency response channel could be constructed, its cost would be prohibitive. Logical
separation of management and runtime channels provides an alternative that can be implemented
in the near term and can be integrated into existing and emerging network components.
Objective
 The goal of this project is to develop an architectural mechanism to support separate protected
communication and computation channels for emergency response  that will automatically
become available to local authorities during a time of crisis when the standard systems become
unavailable because of natural disaster or human (terrorist?) activity. Use of this mechanism will
allow resulting systems to operate in a fashion that is analogous to the emergency lighting
system in a building. When the power goes out, enough lighting comes on to ensure that a safe
exit of the building is possible. When standard communication and computer facilities are
disrupted, then the emergency system should automatically become available for use to provide
limited, temporary support to the local authorities so that they can continue to function.
The emergency-response capability we envision will be a managed subset of the national
information infrastructure using the same physical components but logically separated as an
independent out-of-band domain. Key network nodes, both processing and routing, will be
emergency enabled by way of this multi-domain capability.  Intrusion detection and other means
will provide emergency response triggers for the transition of these nodes to a “safe” mode. Once
in the safe mode, the protected nodes can process emergency and management functions without
interference from other system and network activities, which will be temporarily halted.  After
the emergency situation is resolved, the non-critical activities can be re-enabled, perhaps
gradually, to bring the system back to a normal state.  For protected nodes, the logical separation
of the protected domain will be their most critical and highly assured security function.
3 Approach
 This project encompassed several interrelated tasks.
1. Analysis and design of domain architecture for infrastructure management
2. Implementation of extended attributes for domain management
3. Demonstration of domain separation to protect emergency response capabilities
The implementation task of the project is based on the OpenBSD code line.  OpenBSD provides
a stable development environment, and its emphasis on security and security auditing provide
additional assurance, over and above that available through other commercial and open source
operating systems, that trivial security errors such as buffer overflow do not occur.  Many
commercial entities rely upon open source platforms from the BSD family. This includes Yahoo,
which runs 6000 BSD-based systems, and Hotmail, a Microsoft-owned email system.
Domain Architecture for Infrastructure Management
The protection domains provided at individual processing nodes is based on a ring architecture
[Organick72]. In a generalized ring mechanism, the system binds subjects and objects to specific
rings, and restricts accesses of subjects to objects based on their respective ring bindings.  A ring
3bracket mechanism extends rings to provide specific limitations based on the access mode (e.g.,
read, write, or execute).  Thus, rings provide protection domains in which each object may be
used.
In this task, a software ring architecture  [Clark03] was developed to map specific elements of
the general ring mechanism to the protection structures provided by OpenBSD [Watson01]
(including our mandatory access control extensions), to provide a limited ring mechanism.  This
mechanism is of sufficient functionality to support emergency response domain separation, while
allowing later extension to support a general ring bracket mechanism.  The overall strategy is to
leverage the assurances provided by the OpenBSD extended attribute and mandatory access
control mechanisms, in support of global and persistent ring policy.
Extended Attributes For Domain Management
In this task, the extended-attribute label space provided by OpenBSD extended attributes was
extended to define separate domains (rings) for critical and non-critical processing.
Demonstration
In this task, different security related programs were instrumented to take advantage of domain
protection [Nguyen03]. A small-scale network environment was constructed to demonstrate the
effectiveness of these mechanisms for protecting security-critical resources, processes and
communication.
4 Results
Deliverables for Phase I of this work include:
1. Description of domain architecture for infrastructure management [Clark03]
2. Implementation of extended attributes for domain management
3. Demonstration and description [Nguyen03] of the use of domain management for
protecting security-critical resources, processes and communication.
5 Future Work
Under this proposal, emergency protection domains have been designed and demonstrated for
general-purpose processing (viz., end-system) nodes.  Future work in support of emergency
response for cyber infrastructure management, based on capabilities provided here, will be to
control process scheduling based on domain attributes during emergencies, address the
integration of intrusion detection and other network health-status triggers, the automated
intercommunication of network status among protected nodes, and the domain protection of
interior (e.g., router) nodes.
6 Value to the Objectives of the HS Program
This project has produced results that will directly increase capability of the US to defend and
effectively respond to terrorist attacks against the national critical infrastructure.  Specifically,
using the techniques developed here, the information infrastructure can be better protected and
4more resilient, and as a result, other infrastructures dependent on the information infrastructure
can also be better protected.  Thus, the national capacity to maintain emergency response
capabilities in the face of cyber and other attacks is increased.
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